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Abstract
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) provide a safer driving environment
by allowing vehicles to broadcast safety related messages and inform neighbor-
ing vehicles regarding traffic and road conditions. Safety can only be achieved
if transmission of messages are reliable. However, verification of reliability may
violate privacy. On the other hand, it is desirable that malicious or defective ve-
hicles can be identified and revoked. In this paper, we propose a new protocol
using certificateless signature and reputation system to achieve the sometimes
contradictory requirements of a reliable, private and accountable VANET mes-
sage announcement scheme.
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1 Introduction
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) provide a safer driving environment by allow-
ing vehicles to communicate with each other (V2V) or with road side infrastructure
(V2I). They permit a vehicle to broadcast announcements to neighbouring vehicles
to improve driving safety or traffic efficiency. The drivers benefit from the system
as information on traffic congestion, accidents, potholes or slippery roadways will
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allow receiving vehicles to respond quickly by assessing the situation and making
decisions accordingly.
In order to benefit from the tools of VANETs, the system requires secure com-
munication protocols. Safety can only be achieved if messages are reliable, that is
the messages reflect actual situations. Receiving vehicles must have some assurance
that the message is:
• sent by a legitimate source,
• unmodified,
• not a lie.
The first two goals are commonly achieved by some digital signature schemes, while
the third is not as straightforward. Different techniques have been proposed to
achieve the third requirement. These include threshold method and trust- and reputation-
based models. In a threshold method, message truthfulness is established by knowing
that messages of the same content were sent by many distinct legitimate senders.
Meanwhile, in trust and reputation models, a message is considered reliable if the
message generator has “good” reputation.
However, the verification of message reliability may reveal some information
about the identity of the sending vehicle. It may also allow malicious entities to
trace sending vehicles by comparing messages with the same signature. This may
violate user privacy. On the other hand, complete anonymity may not be desirable,
since malicious or defective vehicles need to be identified for maintenance and law
enforcement purposes. In this paper we will consider how these often contradictory
goals of reliability, privacy and accountability may be satisfied.
Figure 1: A scenario in the CLS announcement scheme
We first give an overview of our solution before discussing these security re-
quirements in greater detail. In our previous work [20], we proposed a reputation
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system for VANETs. The reliability of a message generated by a vehicle is reflected
by its reputation score. A message is considered reliable if the message generator has
sufficiently high reputation. A vehicle consistently announcing reliable messages
increases its reputation score. Meanwhile, the reputation score of an unreliable mes-
sage generator decreases, by means of a feedback mechanism. A feedback report
consists of a numerical score, which represents a receiver’s evaluation of the relia-
bility of the relevant message. The reputation system is managed by a centralised
reputation server (RS) whose role includes admitting and revoking vehicles from the
system. It is also responsible for managing, storing and updating reputation scores
based on the feedback received. This scheme does not provide much privacy since
the identities of all sending and reporting vehicles are made public. The provision
of privacy in a reputation system is a nontrivial matter. Here we design a novel
anonymous announcement scheme for VANET using the reputation system of [20]
which will satisfy all the following goals:
Reliability :
A vehicle will only rely on an announcement if it can be certain that this
announcement was broadcast by a legitimate and present vehicle (sender
authenticity) without unauthorised modification (message integrity). In
addition, there is a high probability that the event has happened (mes-
sage truthfulness). For feedback reporting, unmodified feedbacks (re-
port integrity) are reported by legitimate vehicles (reporter authenticity)
present at the announcement. The system should also be able to tolerate
a small fraction of internal adversaries (system robustness).
Privacy :
An announcement or feedback report cannot be linked to its source by an
unauthorised observer (anonymity). Different announcements or feed-
back reports by one vehicle cannot be linked by an unauthorised ob-
server (unlinkability). Clearly the reputation server has to link feedback
reports and scores to vehicles. However, it may not be necessary to make
the contents of the announcements known to the server (content confi-
dentiality).
Accountability :
Misbehaviour can be traced to a source (traceability) and a source cannot
deny having sent the message (non-repudiation). Furthermore, misbe-
haved vehicles should be prevented from future participation in the net-
work or his identity reported to the authorities (revocation). This applies
to both message generator and feedback reporter.
In order to simultaneously achieve these goals, we construct a scheme using
a certificateless signature scheme (CLS). The adoption of CLS does not require the
use of certificates, which can be unweildy in a large VANET environment, and yet
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does not have the inherent key escrow problem of identity-based signature. This
allows for an efficient as well as secure and anonymous announcement scheme for
VANETs.
The organisation of the paper is as follow. In Section 2, we discuss some pub-
lished literature closely related to our work. We describe the preliminaries of the
scheme in Section 3 and present our certificateless signature scheme in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the operation of the scheme and the scheme is analysed in Sec-
tion 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
This section will focus on some vehicle-generated announcement schemes that ad-
dress the issues of reliability, privacy and accountability in VANETs and discuss
arising issues.
In a large VANET environment where the absence of initial trust is assumed, a
vehicle will only trust an announcement if it can be certain that the message:
• was broadcast unmodified from a legitimate vehicle,
• is not a falsehood.
The first requirement is commonly solved by means of digital signature technique
[2, 7, 9–12, 14, 19, 21, 22, 25, 27]. Signing a message using valid credentials (for
instance, public key certificates) from a trusted authority (TA) assures sender au-
thenticity and message integrity. However, the overhead associated with certificate
management such as storage, distribution, revocation and computational cost of cer-
tificate generation and verification, may be prohibitive [15]. In addition, if the public
keys used to verify signatures are bound to identities in the credentials, it will allow
tracking and profiling of signing vehicles.
We consider two aspects of privacy: anonymity and unlinkability. The problem
of anonymity can be addressed by using group signature [7, 9, 11, 21], where the
group is the set of all cars in the system. Group signatures allow each group mem-
ber to sign on behalf of the group. A verifier knows the signer belongs to a group
without being able to associate the signature with a particular signer. Another ap-
proach to privacy is by using pseudonymous public keys. The use of randomly
chosen and changing identifiers, referred to as pseudonyms, has been proposed in
[7, 14, 19, 27]. Messages can be linked if it is verified using the same pseudonym.
However, linking messages will be more challenging if vehicles change and update
pseudonyms regularly. Pseudonyms can be preloaded or self-generated. The for-
mer method gives rise to other problems such as certificate management and large
storage space. To eliminate these problems, [7] proposed that each vehicle gener-
ates its own pseudonyms. The rate at which pseudonyms are updated depends on
various factors such as the degree of privacy required by a vehicle. However, an
issue associated with this technique is the problem of distinguishability of message
origin, which we discuss later in the section.
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In our work, we adopt a certificateless signature scheme that allows entity au-
thentication and message integrity while eliminating the necessity of certificates.
A vehicle periodically preloads a set of credentials and its reputation scores from
the TA and generates its own pseudonymous key pairs. Each signing key is up-
dated after its short lifetime expires, hence messages signed with a signing key is
only linkable over its short validity period. This approach is in common with most
pseudonym schemes. However, unlike the pseudonym schemes of [7, 14, 19, 27],
our scheme vastly reduces the overhead associated with certificate management.
To achieve the second requirement, different techniques have been proposed.
These include the threshold method [7, 9–11, 14, 19, 21, 25, 27] and trust- and reputation-
based models [2, 12, 22].
The threshold method is used in many recent announcement protocols [7, 9–
11, 14, 19, 21, 25, 27]. It is based on the assumption that an announced event is
more likely to be true if many distinct vehicles are reporting the same event within
a time interval. Hence if a vehicle receives a number of messages exceeding some
threshold, it will assume the event is true and act upon it. The threshold may be
fixed system-wide [10, 25] or flexible [9, 11, 14, 19]. It has to be chosen carefully. It
should not be too high that insufficient endorsement hinders the user from acting
upon the information. It should not be too low that the decision may be affected by
the presence of adversaries.
In order to adopt the threshold method, message origins has to be distinguish-
able. When a vehicle receives a number of announcements of a certain event, it
needs to be sure that each message originated from a different source. This directly
contradicts the requirement for unlinkability. However, such verification is needed
to avoid the Sybil attack [13] where a vehicle signs the same message multiple times
using different identities. Some types of digital signature allow distinguishability
of origin [9, 11], while others do not [7, 21, 27]. In our scheme, we do not rely on
multiple messages to evaluate reliability. We also do not require distinguishability
of message origin. We consider a message to be reliable only if the message gener-
ator has sufficiently high reputation. Not only do we require less computation, this
also allows a vehicle to make decisions and act upon messages quickly.
Several trust- and reputation-based models were proposed, for instance [2, 12,
22]. Do¨tzer et al. [12] proposed a reputation model using an approach called opin-
ion piggybacking. Upon receiving a message, each receiving vehicle appends its own
opinion about the reliability of the message before it forwards the message to neigh-
boring vehicles. The opinion may be based on the content of the message or previ-
ous aggregated opinions attached to the message. To generate an opinion, a receiv-
ing vehicle has to verify, compute and aggregate all previous opinions appended
to the message. This is a significant computational burden on receiving vehicles.
Our scheme is computationally efficient as evaluation of message reliability only
requires a receiving vehicle to verify one signature provided that the message gen-
erator has sufficient high reputation.
Minhas et al. [22] employs three variation of trust models to evaluate message
reliability: role-based trust, majority-based trust and experience-based trust. Role-based
trust assumes vehicles with certain predefined role, such as the traffic patrol or law
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enforcing authorities, have higher trust value compared to other vehicles. Each ve-
hicle possesses a certificate from a trusted authority, for identification and authenti-
cation purposes. Meanwhile, majority-based trust is similar to the threshold method
we discussed earlier. In experience-based trust, the trustworthiness of a vehicle is
evaluated based on how truthful they were in their past direct interaction. Such a
model requires a vehicle to establish long term relationship with other vehicles. This
may not be practical in a large VANET environment. This also implies that a vehicle
is required to store information of other vehicles encountered in the past, which may
cause storage problem. A similar approach of experience-based trust was proposed
by Patwardhan et al. in [2]. In our scheme, we propose a more practical model. A
vehicle may provide feedback, which represents an evaluation of the reliability of
the message received. These feedbacks accumulate to a vehicle’s reputation score.
Hence, short term encounters lead to a long term trust, represented by a vehicle’s
reputation score.
However, the issue of privacy was not addressed in these schemes [2, 12, 22]. In
addition, they adopt a decentralised infrastructure where the problem of account-
ability arise. In our scheme, we utilise the already existing trusted infrastructure of
VANETs that allow us to design a secure authenticated announcement scheme that
preserve privacy while achieving the property of accountability.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we review some fundamental background for a certificateless signa-
ture scheme.
3.1 Certificateless Cryptography
Public Key Cryptography. In public key cryptography (PKC), each user has a pub-
lic and a private key. The private key is kept secret while the public key is published.
A public key of a user is associated with the user by a certificate, that is, a signature
of a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) on the public key. This allows the receiver to
be sure that the public key that they have is the correct public key for the sender. A
receiver who wants to use the public key must verify the corresponding certificate
for the validity of the key. Hence, we require a public key infrastructure - a series of
trusted third parties that can be relied upon to vouch for the connection between an
identity and a particular public key. Inevitably this feature causes a CA to require a
large amount of storage and computing time managing the certificates.
Identity-based Cryptography. To avoid the certificate management problem, Shamir
[28] introduced the concept of identity based cryptography (ID-PKC). The idea was
then practically deployed by Boneh and Franklin in [4]. An identity-based scheme
removes the need for a public key infrastructure by setting an entity’s public key to
be equal to its digital identity. A key generator center (KGC) generates the entity’s
private key using a master secret. An inherent problem of ID-PKC is thus the “key
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escrow” problem: the KGC knows the user’s private keys and has to be complete
trusted.
Certificateless Cryptography. In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] introduced the
concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) which eliminates the
use of certificates in PKC and solves the key escrow problem in ID-PKC. The basic
idea of CL-PKC is that the user constructs a public/private key pair by combining a
value generated by a TA using its master key with a random secret value generated
by the user. We describe such a signature scheme in the next section.
3.2 A Certificateless Signature Scheme
3.2.1 Pairings and Computational Problems
Let G1 and G2 and be an additive group and a multiplicative group, respectively, of
the same prime order q. Let P denote a random generator ofG1 and e : G1×G1 → G2
denote a bilinear map which is typically constructed by Weil or Tate pairing with
properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(Q,W + Z) = e(Q,W ) · e(Q,Z) and e(Q + W,Z) = e(Q,Z) ·
e(W,Z) ∀ Q,W,Z ∈ G1. Consequently, we have e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab,∀ P,Q ∈
G1 and ∀a, b ∈ Z∗q .
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃ P,Q ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1.
3. Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(aP, bQ) ∀ P,Q ∈
G1.
We assume that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is hard in both G1 and G2.
The DLP is defined as follows: Given a generator P of a cyclic additive group G
with order q, and Q ∈ G∗, find an integer a ∈ Z∗q such that Q = aP . In addition,
we assume the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) in G1. The CDHP is
defined as follows: Given a generator P of a cyclic additive group G with order q,
and given (aP, bP ) for unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q , compute abP .
3.2.2 Certificateless Signature Scheme
The certificateless signature scheme (CLS) from [29] initialises the system by running
the set up algorithm CLSsetup(1k) where 1k is a security parameter. CLSsetup()
chooses the groups 〈G1,G2, e〉, where G1,G2 are groups of prime order q and e is a
bilinear pairing, e : G1 × G1 → G2. It also selects 3 cryptographic hash functions
H1,H2,H3, each of which maps from {0, 1}∗ to G1. It chooses an integer s ∈R Z∗q
(where s ∈R Z∗q denotes choosing an element s uniformly at random from the set Z∗q)
as its master secret key. It sets P0 = s · P ∈ G1 as the master public key. CLSsetup()
outputs 〈s, CLSparams = 〈G1,G2, e, q, P, P0,H1,H2,H3〉〉. The master secret key s is
kept confidential while CLSparams is published as system parameters. From now
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on we will assume the availability of CLSparams in the description of the remaining
protocols and algorithms.
During the enrolment of an entity V with an identifier IDV ∈ {0, 1}∗, the enrol-
ment protocol CLSenrol(IDV ) is performed by the TA and V in a secure environment.
This protocol consists of two parts: CLSenrolTA(IDV ) and CLSenrolV (xV ) as below.
CLSenrol(IDV )
TA runs CLSenrolTA(IDV )
Computes QV = H1(IDV ).
Computes xV = sQV .
Outputs a partial private key xV .
TA sends xV securely to V .
V runs CLSenrolV (xV )
Selects a secret value yV ∈R Z∗q .
Sets skV = (xV , yV ).
Sets pkV = yV P .
Outputs (pkV , skV ).
To sign and verify a message M , the singing and verifying algorithms, denoted by
CLSsign()and CLSverify() respectively, are performed as follows.
CLSsign(M, skV = (xV , yV ), IDV , pkV )
Computes U = u · P for u ∈R Z∗q .
Sets v = xV + u · H2(M, IDV , pkV , U) + yV · H3(M, IDV , pkV ).
Outputs signature θV = (U, v).
CLSverify(M, (U, v), IDV , pkV )
Computes QV = H1(IDV ).
Checks if the equality e(v, P ) = e(QV , P )e(H2(M, IDV , pkV , U), U)e(H3(M, IDV ,
pkV ), pkV ) holds. If it does, outputs valid, otherwise outputs ⊥.
We will use this scheme CLS = (CLSsetup, CLSenrol, CLSsign, CLSverify) in our
announcement scheme in Section 5.
4 A Certificateless Anonymous Authenticated Announce-
ment Scheme in VANETs
4.1 Entities in a VANET
A VANET is composed of vehicles equipped with onboard units (OBUs) and sta-
tionary units along the road, known as access points (APs). In addition, there is
a trusted party - the reputation server (RS). We also assume there are malignant
entities who aim to disrupt the system.
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4.1.1 Vehicles and Onboard Units
We assume that the vehicles in our VANET system are equipped with an onboard
unit (OBU) and a tamper resistant device (TRD). An OBU has a short range wireless
communication device which can communicate directly with neighbouring vehi-
cles’ OBUs. The TRD (or black box) has a secure storage for private information
such as secret keys and other cryptographic credentials. It also executes crypto-
graphic operations such as generating signatures correctly and is assumed to have
a secure time stamping service [27]. An adversary who is in control of a black box
may generate fake messages of his own choice, but information in the secure storage
cannot be retrieved, and protocols will still execute correctly.
4.1.2 Reputation Server
We rely on a fully trusted reputation server (RS). The RS is responsible for the distri-
bution and management of identities and cryptographic credentials of the vehicles.
They also maintain the reputation of vehicles. This includes collecting and aggregat-
ing feedback to produce reputation scores. The RS is also responsible for revoking
vehicles. Periodic communication takes place between the RS and vehicles for repu-
tation score retrieval and for feedback reporting. The RS does not need to be online
otherwise. We also assume that the RS is equipped with a secure clock.
We note the assumption of such a fully trusted central authority is not unrealistic.
Most countries have a central authority (such as the Driver and Vehicle Licensing
Agency in the United Kingdom) responsible for the regulation of vehicles.
4.1.3 Access Points
An access point (AP) is a physical device located at fixed locations. Such locations
include along the highways, roads, intersections, roundabouts or traffic lights. An
AP is equipped with at least a network device for short-range wireless communi-
cation. Access points are connected with the reputation server, acting as a commu-
nication interface between vehicles and the RS. The purpose of access points is to
allow vehicles to communicate with the RS in a convenient and frequent manner.
4.1.4 Adversary
One of the common assumptions in VANETs is the presence of a small fraction of
adversaries [9, 14, 23] in the network. This includes external and internal adver-
saries, and rational and irrational adversaries. More details on adversaries can be
found in [24, 27].
An external attacker is an entity who is without possession of any cryptographic
credentials or direct physical access to the system. On the other hand, an internal
attacker is a legitimate user of the VANET who is in possession of the credentials
and black box. A dishonest user may cause more damage as he can control the
black box to generate messages of his choice.
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We assume adversaries are motivated by selfish (rational) or malicious (irra-
tional) intent. A rational attacker has a plan for an attack to achieve his personal
benefit where the benefits outweigh the cost. Meanwhile, an irrational attacker may
attempt to degrade the reputation of others or impact the availability of the network
without a personal gain. For example in [27], a terrorist may intentionally cause traf-
fic accidents and delays to create chaos without considering the consequences. In
our scheme, we consider rational adversaries.
There are two types of attacks we shall consider in our scheme: reputation manip-
ulation and message fraud attack. Reputation manipulation attack means an adversary
inflates or deflates the reputation score of a target vehicle, where this target vehicle
may be the adversary himself. An adversary may also deceive receiving vehicle into
accepting a fake message as valid. We call this a message fraud attack.
Communication channel. In our scheme, we assume that wireless channel between
the reputation server RS, sending vehicles Vs and receiving vehicles Vr is public; that
is, an entity can eavesdrop on the communication passing through the channel. The
admission and initialisation of vehicles into the system is assumed to be conducted
in a secure environment.
4.2 Scheme Overview
The reputation server RS initialises the system by installing a secure certificateless
signature scheme CLS adopted from [29], along with a secure signature scheme SS,
a secret key encryption scheme SKE and a public key encryption scheme PKE. The
RS generates and publishes system parameters to vehicles in the network. The in-
stallation of the various schemes and associated keys onto vehicles is conducted
during the admission of vehicles into the network. Operation of the scheme con-
sists of setup, reputation score retrieval, message broadcast, message verification, feedback
reporting, reputation update and revocation.
To communicate in the network, a vehicle V periodically retrieves a set of creden-
tials from the RS via its nearest access point. To announce a safety related message,
V anonymously sign the message with its reputation score attached and broadcast
to neighboring vehicles. Each signing key key is valid over a short period. A re-
ceiving vehicle V ′ verifies the message based on the validity of the signature and
the reputation of V . It may or may not provide a feedback about V . If it chooses
to, V ′ provides a feedback score to rate its experience with V and signs a feedback
to report to the RS. Upon receipt of the feedback, the RS validates the report based
on V ′’s signature and timing of the feedback reported. It then computes the latest
reputation of V and updates its database.
We note again that the reputation system we use here is essentially that of [20].
The novelty of our scheme lies in the use of privacy and authentication techniques
based on certificateless signature. We will include all the description of the reputa-
tion system for the sake of completion.
10
Setup Reputation
score retrieval
Message
broadcast
Message
verification
Feedback
report
Reputation
updateRevocation
Setup of the RS
and new V s. V generates a
set of (skV , pkV )
after receiving
its rep. scores
and partial keys
from the RS.
Vs announces
a message to
neighbouring Vr.
Vr verifies
the message.
Vr rates its
experience
with Vs and
sends to the RS.
The RS aggre-
gates Vs latest
reputation score.
The RS revokes
V whose
reputation score
decreases to 0.
Figure 2: Flowchart of the scheme operation.
5 Scheme Operation
We describe our scheme by showing how reputation of a vehicle is formed, propa-
gated, updated and utilised to determine the trustworthiness of vehicles. We note
that the CLSsetup(), CLSenrol(), CLSsign() and CLSverify() used in this section has
been presented in Section 3.2.2.
The operation of the scheme consists of the following phases: setup, reputation
score retrieval, message broadcast, message verification, feedback reporting, reputation up-
date and revocation.
5.1 The Setup
The setup creates system parameters and long term keys of the entities in the system.
We describe the setup of the reputation server and vehicles as follow.
5.1.1 Setup of the Reputation Server
The RS installs:
• A secure certficateless signature scheme CLS = (CLSsetup, CLSenrol, CLSsign,
CLSverify) as described in Section 3.2.2.
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• A secure signature scheme, defined by SS = (KGenSS, SSsign, SSverify) where
KGenSS, SSsign and SSverify denotes key generation, signing and verifying
operation for a signature scheme respectively.
• A secure symmetric key encryption scheme, defined by SKE = (KGenSKE, SKEnc,
SKDec) where KGenSKE, SKEnc and SKDec denotes symmetric key generation, en-
cryption and decryption respectively.
• A secure public key encryption scheme, defined by PKE = (KGenPKE, PKEnc, PKDec)
where KGenPKE, PKEnc and PKDec denotes public key generation, encryption and
decryption respectively.
The RS then runs:
• The algorithm CLSsetup(1k) as in section 3.2.2 to get 〈s, CLSparams = 〈G1,G2, e,
q, P, P0,H1,H2,H3〉〉.
• The KGenPKE to generate a key pair (PKRS, SKRS) used to encrypt and decrypt
session keys (please refer to Section 5.2).
• Selects another secure hash functionH4 : {0, 1}n → Z∗q .
• Publishes params = 〈CLSparams,H4, PKRS〉.
• Installs a time-discount function, denoted by TimeDiscount. This is a non-
increasing function whose range is [0, 1]. It takes input a non-negative value
representing a time difference, and outputs a number between 0 and 1. For
example, it can be defined as:
TimeDiscount(t) =
{
1− t/ΨTD if t < ΨTD;
0 if t ≥ ΨTD,
where ΨTD is a positive constant.
• Installs the reputation aggregation algorithm Aggr as described in section 5.6.1.
5.1.2 Admission of New Vehicles
• Each vehicle is assign with a unique identity IDV ∈ {0, 1}∗.
• The RS installs CLS, SS, SKE and PKE schemes onto each vehicle V where V gen-
erates a pair of unique long term key pair:
1. The key pair (pkV , skV ) generated using KGenSS.
2. The key pair (PKV , SKV ) generated using KGenPKE.
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The authentication process to validate pkV and PKV to the RS takes place during
the V ’s registration before it is admitted into the system. The secret keys are
stored within a V ’s black box while the public keys are kept within its onboard
unit.
• The RS creates a database that will store the following data for every vehicle
in the system: a vehicle’s identity IDV , a unique long term public key pkV and
PKV , a set of pseudonyms pseuiV , reputation scores repscore
i
V , timestamps t
i
V
on (pseuiV , repscore
i
V ), and all feedback reported for the vehicle (see Section
5.2 and 5.5).
• We require three configurable public parameters ΨRS, Ψt and T. The parameter
ΨRS acts as a threshold and is used by a vehicle to determine whether or not
another vehicle is reputable. It is a constant between 0 and 1. The parameter
Ψt also acts as a threshold and used to determine whether or not a message
tuple is sufficiently fresh for feedback reporting. The parameter T is a large
time interval, over which a sufficiently large number of vehicles report feedback
relating to a vehicle.
5.2 Reputation Score Retrieval
In this phase, a vehicle V retrieves from the RS a set of its credentials CreV =
{(pseuiV , repscoreiV , tiV , xiV ) : i = 1, · · · , n}, where pseuiV is a random string, repscoreiV
is a reputation score, tiV is a timestamp for the validity period of (pseu
i
V , repscore
i
V ),
and xiV is a partial secret key.
When it drives into the wireless communication range of an access point, the
communication takes place as follow.
• V identifies itself to the RS and sets up a session key with RS.
1. V signs a request message reqkey together with its public key pkV :
σ ← SSsignskV (pkV , reqkey).
2. V generates a random session key skeyV using KGenSKE to encrypt the re-
quest and signature:
reqV ← SKEncskeyV (pkV , reqkey, σ).
3. V encrypts the session key using RS’s public key PKRS:
keyV ← PKEncPKRS(skeyV ).
4. V sends {reqV , keyV } to RS via the wireless channel.
• RS sends V its reputation scores and partial keys for the CLS.
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1. RS decrypts keyV using PKDecSKRS to obtain skeyV . It then uses SKDecskeyV
to decrypt reqV . Now RS has pkV , reqkey, and the signature σ.
2. Upon verification of σ using SSverify, RS gets Vs’s current reputation
score repscore from the database and computes repscoreiV to be used at
time beginning tiV by calculating repscore
i
V = repscore·TimeDiscount(tc−
tiV ), where tc denotes the current time, until repscore
i
V goes below the
reputation threshold ΨRS. Suppose that i = 1, . . . , n.
3. For i = 1, . . . n, RS runs CLSenrolRS({pseuiV , repscoreiV , tiV }) to obtain xiV :
xiV ← CLSenrolRS({pseuiV , repscoreiV , tiV }).
4. RS forms CreV = {(pseuiV , repscoreiV , tiV , xiV ) : i = 1, · · · , n}.
5. RS encrypts CreV with the session key skeyV using SKEnc:
EncCreV ← SKEncskeyV (CreV ).
6. RS sends EncCreV to V via the wireless channel.
• V generates public/private keys for the CLS.
1. V decrypts EncCreV using SKDec with the session key skeyV .
2. For i = 1, . . . n, V runs CLSenrolV (xiV ) to obtain a set of key pairs (pk
i
V , sk
i
V ):
(pkiV , sk
i
V ) = (y
i
V P, (x
i
V , y
i
V ))← CLSenrolV (xiV ).
3. The set of secret keys skiV is stored in the black box while the rest of the
other parameters and public keys are stored in the vehicle’s OBU.
The retrieval period varies, depending on how often a vehicle would like to ob-
tain its latest reputation score or before it runs out of keys. A vehicle is likely
to retrieve its credentials when its time-discounted reputation value repscoreiV ·
TimeDiscount(tc − tiV ), where tc denotes the current time, is approaching or below
the reputation threshold ΨRS. There is a tradeoff between the frequency a vehicle re-
trieves its keys from the RS and the efficiency of the scheme. Long intervals between
retrieval period may be desirable as it may ease the management load of the RS who
does not need to compute the keys for a vehicle frequently. However, it will lead
to storage problems if a vehicle needs to preload a lot of keys for use over a long
period of time.
Meanwhile, a shorter interval between retrieval periods solves the storage prob-
lem as a vehicle only needs to store fewer keys for a shorter time duration. It also
provides a simpler means of revocation. Once it runs out of keys, a misbehaved
vehicle would not be able to obtain the next set of keys from the RS. However, it
implies frequent interactions between the RS and a vehicle.
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5.3 Message Broadcast
An announcing vehicle Vs generates a road-related message msg and broadcasts it to
its neighbouring vehicles. This is described as follows.
1. Vs forms a MSG = (h = H4(msg), tb) where h = H4(msg) is a hash of the message
and tb is the time when the message was announced.
2. The CLSsign() takes as input MSG, Vs’s signing key skiVs , {pseuiVs , repscoreiVs , tiVs}
and Vs’s public key pkiVs . It returns a signature θVs = (U, v).
θVs ← CLSsign(MSG, skiVs , {pseuiVs , repscoreiVs , tiVs}, pkiVs)
3. Vs forms a message tuple M = (msg, tb, θVs , pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
, repscoreiVs , t
i
Vs
) and
broadcasts M to its neighbouring vehicles.
5.4 Message Verification
Upon receiving the message tuple M , a receiving vehicle, say Vr, performs the fol-
lowing procedure:
1. It determines whether it is interested in the message msg. If it is, it computes
h = H4(msg).
2. Vr inputs θVs into its trusted hardware. The trusted hardware retrieves the cur-
rent time tr from its embedded clock, and then stores the tuple (θVs , tr) within
the trusted hardware. The trusted hardware outputs tr to Vr.
3. Vr determines whether the broadcasting vehicle is reputable, that is, repscoreiVs·
TimeDiscount(tr − tiVs) ≥ ΨRS.
4. Vr determines message freshness. A message is considered to be fresh if tr −
tb ≤ Ψt where Ψt is very short time period after a sending vehicle announced
a message.
5. Vr runs CLSverify(MSG, θVs , {pseuiVs , repscoreiVs , tiVs}, pkiVs). If it returns accept,
then the signature θVs is considered valid. Otherwise Vr rejects the message.
The message msg is considered reliable if all the above requirements are satisfied.
The message tuple M is kept for future feedback reporting. If it does not fulfill
the requirements, Vs is not considered as trustworthy and msg is not considered as
reliable and will not be taken into consideration. In the latter case, if Steps 4 and 5
are positive, then the message tuple M is still stored for future feedback reporting.
Otherwise it is discarded.
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5.5 Feedback Reporting
In this phase, when vehicle Vr has its own experience about the event that the mes-
sage msg describes, it is able to judge the trustworthiness of the message. Then if Vr
wants to report feedback to the reputation server, it performs the following proce-
dure.
1. Vr generates a feedback rating feedrate ∈ {0, 1} where feedrate = 1 if msg is
reliable and feedrate = 0 if msg is not reliable.
2. Vr forms a feedback = (feedrate, h, tr, tb, θVs , pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
).
3. Vr runs the CLSsign() that takes as input a feedback, a feedback reporter’s
signing key skjVr , {pseujVr , repscorejVr , tjVr} and Vr’s public key pkjVr . It returns
a signature θVr = (U ′, v′).
θVr ← CLSsign(feedback, skjVr , {pseujVr , repscorejVr , tjVr}, pkjVr)
4. Vr casts a feedback report = (feedback, θVr , pk
j
Vr
).
When Vr drives into the wireless communication range of a AP, it sends the
feedback report to the RS via the AP.
5.6 Reputation Update
In this phase, the reputation server updates the reputation score repscoreVs of vehi-
cle Vs. Upon receipt of a feedback report, the RS retrieves (repscoreiVs , t
i
Vs
, repscorejVr ,
tjVr) from its database based on (pseu
i
Vs
, pseujVr) for Vs and Vr respectively before per-
forms the algorithm below.
1. It determines whether tr − tb ≤ Ψt where Ψt is small. This is performed to
ensure that a receiving vehicle cannot forward this message to other collud-
ing vehicles and together launch an attack to manipulate the reputation of the
broadcasting vehicle.
2. It runs CLSverify(feedback, θVr , {pseujVr , repscorejVr , tjVr}, pkjVr). If it returns
accept, then the signature θVr is considered valid. Otherwise RS rejects the
feedback.
3. It runs CLSverify(MSG, θVs , {pseuiVs , repscoreiVs , tiVs}, pkiVs). If it returns accept,
then the signature θVs is considered valid. Otherwise RS rejects the feedback.
4. If the checks pass then the reputation server considers the feedback report as
valid and stores it in the database.
The RS applies the reputation aggregation algorithm Aggr (Section 5.6.1) on all
stored feedback relating to Vs in order to compute the latest reputation score for
vehicle Vs. It then replaces the previous reputation score in the database with its
latest reputation score.
16
5.6.1 The Reputation Aggregation Algorithm
In this section, we describe the reputation aggregation algorithm Aggr from [20].
The Aggr computes the latest reputation score for a vehicle V based on all stored
feedback, as follows:
1. The Aggr selects all feedback reported for V whose corresponding message
tuple was broadcast from T time ago up to now. Any feedback whose cor-
responding message was broadcast earlier than T time ago is ignored, and
deleted if necessary for data storage efficiency. We denote ta as the time when
this aggregation is running.
2. Multiple feedback reported by a vehicle Vz for V is aggregated into one in-
termediate value rˆVz . Let FVz denote the set of feedback reported by Vz for V
and whose corresponding message was broadcast from T time ago up to now.
Each entry in FVz has feedback rating feedrateb corresponds to the message
broadcasted at time tb. The value rˆVz is aggregated using weighted average as
follows:
rˆVz =
∑
feedback ∈ FVz
feedrateb ·
(
T− (ta − tb)
)
∑
feedback ∈ FVz
(
T− (ta − tb)
) . (1)
This gives more recent feedback a greater weight than less recent feedback. Let
V denote the set of vehicles that each has reported at least one feedback for V
in the past T time. The value rˆVz is computed for each vehicle Vz ∈ V .
3. Let V− denote the set of vehicles reporting at least one negative feedback for
V in the past T time. The latest reputation score repscoreV is computed as
follows:
repscoreV =
{ ∑
Vz ∈ V
rˆVz
|V| if |V−| < Ψnf;
0 otherwise,
(2)
where Ψnf is a configurable public parameter. The intuition of this equation
is that repscoreV is computed as the average of rˆVz if not too many vehicles
reported negative feedback for V in the past T time; otherise repscoreV de-
creases to 0, indicating that V has conducted message fraud attack.
5.7 Revocation
In our paper, a vehicle retrieves a set of credentials CreV = (pseuiV , repscore
i
V , t
i
V , x
i
V )
from the RS. The design of our scheme allows a shorter interval of credentials re-
trieval. Frequent credentials retrieval allows a vehicle to obtain its latest reputation
score as the reputation score of a vehicle evolves, based on the reliability of messages
that the vehicle announces. A vehicle whose reputation score decreases to 0 will be
revoked from the system. The RS will stop issuing pseudonyms, reputation scores,
timestamps and the partial keys. A misbehaved vehicle would then not be able to
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compute its secret and its public key. Therefore, it would not be able to participate
in future communication in the network.
6 Analysis
In this section, we analyse the security of our scheme, and evaluate its performance.
We compare our scheme with schemes that adopt a pseudonyms method [7, 27],
which is of the most interest to us in this work.
6.1 Security Analysis
We compare our scheme with Hybrid [7] and pseudonymous public key (PPK) [27]
based on three main security requirements of reliability, privacy and accountabil-
ity. We consider the eight security requirements as discussed in Section 1 and sum-
marised our finding in Table 1 below.
6.1.1 Reliability
The requirement of sender authenticity and message integrity are satisfied in all
three schemes, as long as the digital signature techniques used are secure. Similarly,
in feedback reporting, reporter authenticity and report integrity are achieved if the
digital signature schemes are secure. We also require the signature, public and sym-
metric key encryption schemes adopted during reputation score retrieval phase in
section 5.2 to be secure. This is to ensure that the RS provides the correct credentials
after verifying the legitimacy of a requesting vehicle V .
However, the property of message truthfulness is not provided in Hybrid as
distinguishability of message origin is difficult to achieve without an online trusted
authority. Hence, the threshold technique cannot be adopted. It is also not satisfied
in the scheme proposed in PPK as, for the same message, a signing vehicle can
disguise as multiple vehicles. In our scheme a message is regarded as truthful if the
message originator has a “good” reputation. Hence in order to lie successfully, an
adversary could do one of two things: it can manipulate the reputation score of the
sending vehicle, or it can manipulate the message content of an announcement.
In the latter case, neither an external nor an internal adversary will be able to
convince receiving vehicles that a modified message is valid if the certificateless
signature scheme is secure. On the other hand, an internal adversary with a high
reputation score can deceive a receiving vehicle into accepting a false message eas-
ily: it simply broadcasts the false message. However, if it does this persistently over
a long period, then the negative feedback will result in a decrease in its reputation
score. Eventually its reputation score will decrease to 0 and it will be revoked from
the system.
To manipulate the reputation score of a target vehicle V , firstly an adversary
could impersonate V and broadcast false messages in order for V to receive neg-
ative feedback and thereby decrease its reputation score. This cannot be done if
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the certificateless signature scheme is secure. Secondly an adversary could instead
replace V ’s reputation score with a lower one in a broadcast message. Again this
could not be done if the CLS is secure. Lastly an adversary could provide negative
feedback for announcements made by V . Clearly an external adversary cannot per-
form this attack given that the CLS is secure. An internal adversary acting on its
own can only report a false feedback per announcement, and this will have only a
small impact on V ’s reputation score. Even if the internal adversary colludes with a
group of other internal adversaries, the effect will remain small if the proportion of
dishonest vehicles is small, as is the assumption. In addition, the provision of times-
tamps limits the vehicles who can provide feedback to those in proximity when the
message is announced.
Hence we see that our scheme provides reliability and also provides system ro-
bustness in the presence of a small fraction of adversaries.
6.1.2 Privacy
In PPK and our scheme, messages are linkable only over the short validity period
of a pseudonym. In Hybrid, a vehicle uses its group signing key to certify a self-
generated pseudonym. The rate at which pseudonyms are updated depends on the
various factors. Hence, similar to our scheme and PPK, messages signed using the
same pseudonym are linkable over its short lifetime (marked X∗ in Table 1). This
is a slight compromise of privacy in favour of reducing storage and communication
costs. The length of the validity period can be adjusted according to the level of
privacy required. In our scheme, this applies to both announcements and feedback
reporting. The request activity for credentials made by V is also unlinkable using a
secure symmetric key encryption scheme where a random session key is generated
to encrypt each request. The session key is then encrypted using a secure public key
encryption scheme.
Anonymity of broadcast messages is achieved by both Hybrid and PPK. In our
scheme, communications for the retrieval of reputation scores and pseudonyms are
protected by signatures and encryptions. As long as these schemes are secure, a ve-
hicle and its credentials will be anonymous. Hence our scheme preserves anonymity
in reputation score retrieval, message announcements and feedback reporting.
Note that the above refers to privacy against any eavesdropper apart from the
trusted authority. None of the schemes provide any privacy against the TA (RS in
our case) in the sense that if a set of broadcast messages were presented to the TA, it
would be able to link the messages to the senders. There is also no privacy against
the RS in feedback reporting. Since the RS is trusted to correctly manage the rep-
utation system, this is not a great compromise. Note though that the RS does not
know the activities of the vehicles since a feedback report only contains a hash of
the message content.
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6.1.3 Accountability
The property of traceability is satisfied in all schemes. The group signature in Hy-
brid allows a TA to open signature of malicious vehicles, where the identity of mis-
behaved vehicles is revealed by law enforcement authorities for liability purposes.
In PPK as well as our scheme, the TA is able to search in its database and trace the
identity of misbehaved vehicles.
Neither Hybrid nor PPK provides non-repudiation. The group signature tech-
nique used in Hybrid permit the issuer to create the private keys of group members.
In the scheme in PPK, the TA generates the secret key for all vehicles. Therefore,
these schemes does not achieve non-repudiation as the signer is not the sole holder
of the signing key. In our scheme, the RS does not have access to entities’ private key
as it only generates an entity with a partial private key. This satisfies the requirement
of non-repudiation.
Revocation in Hybrid is achieved by having a vehicle’s revocation token added
into the revocation list. Upon verifying a message, signature generated from a re-
voked vehicle will not be accepted. In PPK, the TA exhaustively search in its huge
database where it stores all the anonymous certificates issued to vehicles to find the
real identity of a misbehaved vehicle. In our scheme, the RS maintains a map from
a vehicle’s long term identity to its set of pseudonyms, where the RS can perform
an inverse mapping and identify the vehicle whose reputation score decreases to 0.
The authority will then stop issuing pseudonyms, reputation scores and partial keys
to misbehaved vehicles and hence, these vehicles would not be able to generate its
secret value, its public key and compute a full secret key to announce a message.
Security Analysis
Security goals Security components Hybrid [7] PPK [27] Our scheme
Reliability
Sender’s Authenticity X X X
Message Integrity X X X
Message truthfulness × × X
Privacy Anonymity X X XUnlinkability X∗ X∗ X∗
Accountability
Non-repudiation × × X
Revocation X X X
Traceability X X X
Table 1: Comparison of security analysis
6.2 Performance Analysis
We compare the performance of our scheme with Hybrid [7] and PPK [27]. The
group signature (GS) in Hybrid used to certify self-generated pseudonym is adopted
from [5] and we choose to employ elliptic curve cryptosystem, such as ECDSA
scheme [6, 16, 17] as the basic signature algorithm to sign messages, which will also
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be used in PPK. We set security level l = 80 bits for message signatures and l = 128
bits for certificates in Hybrid and PPK. This is a similar adoption of values and sig-
nature algorithm as in Hybrid, for the purpose of comparison. We summarise our
findings in Tables 2 and 3. The question of how usable the system is measured in
terms of message drop rate and the effect of the availability of the RS and AP is
demonstrated in simulation results in [20]. We will summarise the findings here
(Section 6.3)and refer the reader to [20] for details.
Computational cost. We evaluate the computational cost of signature generation
and verification in the broadcast of messages. As observed in [8, 9], the two most
expensive operations are multiplications in G1 and pairing evaluation, which we
shall consider here. We compare the cost between our scheme with Hybrid [7] and
PPK [27] for t = 1, as our scheme requires only one message provided that the mes-
sage generator has sufficiently high reputation.
The signing operation in PPK requires 2 scalar multiplications and the verifi-
cation requires 4 scalar multiplications. Meanwhile, the Hybrid scheme requires a
vehicle to generate 2 signatures; a group signature adopted from [5] to certify a self-
generated pseudonym pk and a signature similar to PPK on the announced mes-
sage. The group signature requires 8 scalar multiplications and 1 pairing operation
for the signing phase, while the verification phase requires 5 scalar multiplications
and 3 pairing operations. The signature generation and verification on a message is
then similar to PPK described earlier.
The signing procedure of our scheme requires 3 scalar multiplications and the
verification requires 4 pairing operations. These findings are summarised in Table
2. We see that the computational cost for our scheme is comparable to PPK and
more efficient compared to Hybrid. In addition, as noted before, in our scheme, a
receiving vehicle may make a decision on whether to rely on a broadcast message
immediately, while in PPK and Hybrid, a receiving vehicle typically requires a few
messages before reliability can be confirmed.
Our scheme has additional operations where Vr may choose to provide a feed-
back to rate its experience with the message generator. In this case, the computa-
tional cost is that of 1 signature. The verification of feedback requires 2 signatures
verifications. This is performed by the RS and can be done offline.
Signature length. The signature in PPK generated using elliptic curve digital signa-
ture algorithm (ECDSA)[6, 16, 17] comprises of 2 elements of G1. A group signature
in Hybrid comprises of 2 elements ofG1 and 5 elements ofZq. Meanwhile, the length
of signature in our scheme composed of 2 elements of G1, which is similar to PPK.
To provide a security level 280, we can set q to be 190-bit long and the element in G1
is 191-bit long by choosing an appropriate curve such as NIST curve [6]. Thus, the
length of signature generated on a message is 48 bytes in our scheme and PPK. In
Hybrid, the message signature is 48 bytes and the length of signature on the certi-
fied pseudonym is of 224 bytes (for a security level 2128, we have |q| = 255 bits and
|G1|=256 bits), which sums up to 272 bytes generated by a vehicle. This again shows
that our scheme provides message signatures with length comparable to those of
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existing schemes. This result is summarised in Table 3.
Communication cost. A message M in Hybrid and PPK consists of: (θsk(msg), msg,
certTA(pk), pk, t), which denotes signature generated on an announced message,
the message, its certificate which essentially is the signature of the TA on a ve-
hicle’s public key, the vehicle’s public key and a timestamp respectively. To pro-
vide a security level of 280, we can take q to be 190-bit long and the element in
G1 to be 191-bit long. According to [3] the size of safety messages is 100 bytes
and we choose 8 bytes for timestamp, using the unix 64-bit timestamp. Based on
the implementation in [6, 18], the size of the public key is 25 bytes, message sig-
nature is 48 bytes and TA certificate is 64 bytes. Hence the length of the message
in PPK is L = 48 + 100 + 64 + 25 + 8 = 245 bytes. In Hybrid, the message size is
L = 48+100+224+25+8 = 405 bytes. We note that the implementation of GS in [5]
adopted by Hybrid is not available to us, hence we use the similar values in Hybrid
which were calculated using the number of 32-bit word multiplications required for
GS signing and verifying, extracted from [6, 18].
In our scheme, a message is composed of: (θVs(msg), msg, pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
, repscoreiVs ,
tirsVs , tb), where θVs(msg), msg, pk
i
Vs
, pseuiVs , repscore
i
Vs
, tirsVs and tb denotes a signa-
ture generated on an announced message, the message, a vehicle’s public key, its
pseudonym, its reputation score and a timestamp on the reputation score and mes-
sage broadcasted respectively. The size of the public key and pseudonym is of an
element G1 each, and reputation score of size 1 byte. Therefore the size of the mes-
sage size is L = 48 + 100 + 24 + 24 + 1 + 8 + 8 = 213 bytes. We observed that our
scheme yield the shortest message size compared to these two schemes. This result
is summarised in Table 3.
Our scheme is also composed of a feedback reporting phase where a receiving
vehicle Vr may choose to rate its experience with the message generator Vs. A feed-
back report is composed of: ((feedrate, h, tr, tb, θVs , pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
), θVr , pk
j
Vr
). The size
of the feedrate is of 1 byte, the timestamp tr and tb is of 8 bytes each, and hash of
the announced event h is of an element q, which is 24 bytes. The pseudonym pseuiVs
and both public keys pkiVs and pk
j
Vr
is an element of G1 each respectively. The signa-
ture generated by Vr on the feedback is of two elements of G1, similar to θVs . Hence
the length of the feedback report is F = 1 + 24 + 8 + 8 + 48 + 24 + 24 + 48 + 24 = 137
bytes.
Storage cost. We compare the storage cost of our scheme with PPK during credential
retrieval phase given the similar approach of preloading credentials onto a vehicle.
For each credential retrieval period, PPK preloads a large set of key pairs and their
corresponding certificate onto each vehicle, for its usage over a long period of time
(i.e. a year). The next retrieval may occur during periodical vehicle maintenance
visits, for instance. The public and private key is 25 bytes and 24 bytes respectively,
using ECDSA-192 and a TA certificate is 64 bytes using ECDSA-256. This sums up
to storage space of 25+24+64 = 113 bytes per key. In [26], they assumed an average
a driver uses his car is 2 hours per day, where the lifetime of each key is one minute.
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Then the number of required keys per year is approximately 43800, which amounts
to storage space of 4.95 Mbytes on each vehicle.
In our scheme, a vehicle retrieves from the RS a set of credentials CreV = (pseuiV ,
repscoreiV , t
i
V , x
i
V ). The partial key x
i
V and pseudonym pseu
i
V is an element of G1
each, hence xiV and pseu
i
V is of 24 bytes each for |G1| = 191 bits. The sum of storage
space is of 8+1+24+24 = 57 bytes per key, which is more efficient as it is about half
of the PPK key size. The retrieval period in our scheme may be shorter and flexible,
depending on whether a vehicle would like to obtain its latest reputation score or
when it runs out of credentials.
Msg signature Msg signature Group signature Group signature
Scheme Sign Verify Sign Verify
PPK 2 ·G1 4 ·G1 N/A N/A
Hybrid 2 ·G1 4 ·G1 8 ·G1 + 1 · P 5 ·G1 + 3 · P
Ours 3 ·G1 4 · P N/A N/A
Here n ·G1 denotes n scalar multiplications and n · P denotes n pairing operations.
Table 2: Comparison of computational cost
Signature Communication Storage
Scheme length (bytes) cost cost
PPK 2|G1| (48) 245 bytes 113 bytes/key
Hybrid (Group sig) 2|G1|+ 5|q| (224) 405 bytes -
(Msg sig) 2 ·G1 (48) -
Ours 2 ·G1 (48) 213 bytes 57 bytes/key
Table 3: Comparison of communication and storage cost (l = 80)
6.3 Effect of temporary unavailability of RS and AP
The effect of the temporary unavailability of RS and AP can be measured in terms
of message drop rates: the average rate that reliable messages are rejected by a re-
ceiving vehicle due to low reputation scores of the broadcasting vehicles. Since the
reputation system we use here is the same as that of [20] the simulation results on
message drop rates will also apply to our scheme. We summarise the results here
and refer the reader to [20] for details.
The simulations are carried out with conditions in line with other studies in the
literature. If RS and AP are all functioning continuously, the message drop rate de-
pends (obviously) on the density of the vehicles and the density of APs. It appears
that the message drop rates decreases drammatically when the density of AP is in-
creased from very low. Subsequent increases have much smaller effect. For example,
if there are 2 APs per km2, the message drop rate is 0.1 if the density of vehicles is 500
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per 10km2, while the message drop rate is less than 0.05 if there are 4 APs per km2.
This also confirms that even with initial reputation score of 0, a new vehicle will
be able to establish its own reputation fairly reasonably. This is because a receiving
vehicle may still provide a feedback even if it considered a message unreliable due
to low reputation.
Temporary unavailability of RS. With 2 to 5 APs per km2, the message drop rates
increases proportionally as the length of unavailability of RS, until a certain point
where the message drop rate is 1. This point is dependent upon the time discount
parameter ΨTD and the reputation threshold ΨRS. If ΨTD and ΨRS are set conserva-
tively to 1 hour and 0.8 respectively (and the experiment time is only 30 minutes)
then the message drop rate reaches 1 in 12 minutes. It is expected that in a real-
world implementation with a much longer ΨTD the time to reach message drop rate
1 would be much longer.
Temporary unavailability of APs. The simulation result shows that for 5 APs per
km2 with the density of 500 vehicles per 10km2, even the unavailability of up to 50%
of APs for 25 minutes contribute only slightly to the increase in message drop rate.
Again, this is not unexpected, since a vehicle can always retrieve its reputation score
and report feedback when it comes across another functioning AP.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a novel privacy-preserving authentication protocol for VANETs
based on certificateless signature and reputation systems. To our knowledge, this is
the first certificateless announcement scheme for VANETs that has been proposed in
the literature. We have shown that our scheme is efficient and robust, and achieves
the desirable properties of a reliable, anonymous and accountable announcement
scheme without introducing the problems of certificate management and overhead.
Some questions remain open for future research:
• In our scheme, an announced event is only utilised by its neighbouring vehi-
cles. It might be of interest to extend the current scheme to where a message
can be utilised by vehicles in a greater area. How this may be done without
compromising the security against reputation manipulation attacks is the sub-
ject of future research.
• In this paper, we present a simple feedback aggregation algorithm based on
binary feedback ratings. It might be of interest to investigate alternative ap-
proaches which allow continuous feedback ratings and thus provide richer
results.
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